HALLERFINAL

1/12/2007 11:23:49 AM

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OUTREACH STATUTES
UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Jason S. Haller ∗
This Comment argues that the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
1
Constitution does not always restrain a state from imposing its cor2
porate internal-affairs law on corporations from other jurisdictions.
Recognizing that the Constitution correctly restrains many forms of
legislative meddling, this Comment concludes that some regulation is
nonetheless constitutional. The argument is presented in the context
of two legal extremes: Delaware law, which finds such regulation un3
constitutional per se, and California law, which contains statutes that
regulate the internal affairs of out-of-state corporations doing most of
4
their business in California.
When a controversy implicating a corporation’s internal affairs
arises, courts must decide which jurisdiction’s corporate code to apply. Under the common law, courts usually choose the law of the ju5
risdiction of incorporation. This choice-of-law principle is called the
6
“internal affairs” doctrine. Applying the doctrine hypothetically, a
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, The College of New Jersey.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2
“Internal affairs” include, at minimum, the relations between a corporation’s
shareholders, officers, directors, and the corporation itself. McDermott, Inc. v.
Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
313 cmt. a (1971). Shareholder voting disputes and directors’ standard of care are
typical internal-affairs issues.
3
See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1116
(Del. 2005).
4
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006)
5
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 621 (1983) (dictum). But see Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 2004 WI 39, ¶
23, 270 Wis. 2d 356, ¶ 23, 677 N.W.2d 298, 306–07 (“Given this clear statutory language, and Wisconsin's failure to adopt the internal affairs doctrine, either by statute
or through case law, we conclude that . . . Wisconsin law should be applied in determining whether the directors or offices [sic] breached their fiduciary duty . . . .”).
6
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (dictum). In Edgar, the court
stated:
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New Jersey corporation should always expect New Jersey law to govern its internal-affairs disputes, no matter which jurisdiction adjudicates the dispute.
Some states have carved out exceptions to the internal affairs
7
8
doctrine, the most important being “outreach statutes.” Under certain conditions, outreach statutes provide that forum law applies to a
foreign corporation’s internal affairs (a “foreign corporation” is one
that is not incorporated within the forum state; the term does not
9
necessarily mean a corporation from another country). Such statutes can augment, or even override, the law of the jurisdiction of in10
corporation.
By subjecting corporations’ internal affairs to an additional legislative regime, outreach statutes challenge the internal affairs doctrine’s central premise—that only one law should govern the internal
11
Such a fundamental tension will resolve
affairs of a corporation.
only if 1) the internal affairs doctrine evolves to accommodate outThe internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or
between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. b (1971)).
7
Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of Corporate Laws: The United States, the
European Community and the Race to Laxity, 3 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 56 (1994).
8
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006) (setting forth conditions under which foreign corporations are subject to California laws that regulate,
among other things, election and removal of directors, directors’ standard of care,
liability of directors for unlawful distributions, shareholders’ right to cumulative voting, limitations on mergers, and limitations on sale of assets); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1602
(West 1990); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1315–1320 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 2005) (applying New York law to foreign corporations regarding issues of production of shareholder lists, director liability, and reorganizations); see also, e.g., Havlicek v. Coast-toCoast Analytical Servs. Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (construing section 1602 to apply to foreign corporations regardless of the applicability of
section 2115); N. Am. Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 877, 882–83
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“There are a myriad of statutory provisions that apply to foreign corporations that are not included in section 2115 . . . . [T]hese statutory provisions . . . apply to all foreign corporations, not just to corporations which meet the
percentage figures prescribed in section 2115.”).
9
E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1704 (West 2002) (“[T]his chapter applies to all foreign corporations transacting business in this state . . . .”); see Deborah A. DeMott,
Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1985, at 161, 162.
10
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006).
11
See generally Grosset v. Wenaas, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), cert.
granted sub nom., depublished by Grosset v. Wenaas (Huang), 127 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2006);
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
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reach statutes; or 2) all outreach statutes are repealed. Some states
have embraced outreach statutes, finding that they supplement the
12
Others, most notably
basic rule of the internal affairs doctrine.
Delaware, have categorically rejected them.
Delaware’s strongest argument for universally invalidating out13
reach statutes is that the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
14
restrains state legislatures from enacting them. The corollary of this
argument is that the Commerce Clause mandates the strict application of the internal affairs doctrine. Facially, the Commerce Clause
simply grants Congress the positive power to regulate interstate
15
commerce. But it is beyond question that it also has a dormant (or
negative) power that continuously restrains states from passing laws
16
unduly burdensome to interstate commerce. Some argue that outreach statutes, by undermining the simplicity and efficiency of the internal affairs doctrine, are unduly burdensome to interstate com17
merce and therefore violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Although this issue has yet to reach the Supreme Court of the
United States, state legislatures and courts have been reacting for
decades. On the legislative front, California enacted section 2115 of
18
the California Corporations Code, an outreach statute seemingly tai19
Section 2115
lored to survive dormant-Commerce-Clause scrutiny.
contains extensive jurisdictional hooks that drastically limit the number of occasions where it applies, thus reducing its burden on inter20
state commerce.
On the litigation front, the California Supreme Court has long
since upheld the validity of section 2115 under the dormant Com-

12

E.g., Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(California).
13
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14
See VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1115, 1116 (“The ‘internal affairs doctrine is a major tenet of Delaware corporation law having important federal constitutional underpinnings.’” (quoting McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987))).
15
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 (1824).
16
See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996); Associated Indus.
of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1994); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299 (1851); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 6. For the tests to determine whether a
regulation is unduly burdensome, see infra Part III.
17
See VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1115.
18
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006).
19
See John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 57 (1985)
(“The California approach represents the most serious current challenge to [the internal affairs doctrine] . . . .”).
20
See infra notes 70–72. But cf. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1315–1320 (Consol. 1983
& Supp. 2005) (applying to all corporations doing business in New York).
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21

merce Clause. But recently the Delaware Supreme Court, in Van22
tagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., came out against outreach statutes, declining to apply section 2115 to a shareholder voting
23
dispute. The court held that the dormant Commerce Clause mandates the constant, universal application of the traditional internal af24
fairs doctrine, to the exclusion of the California statute.
This Comment argues that VantagePoint’s state- and constitutional-law analyses are misleading and should not influence legal
trends regarding the relationship between the dormant Commerce
25
Clause and the way courts choose an internal affairs regime. It concludes that Supreme Court of the United States precedent does not
support a constitutionally mandated internal affairs doctrine. It also
concludes that outreach statutes that are narrow in scope are constitutionally permissible.
Part I discusses the internal affairs doctrine’s historical development and how it became the predominant method of choosing internal corporate affairs law. It then discusses the doctrine’s modern
articulation and justifications. Part II introduces outreach statutes
and examines the mechanics of section 2115 of the California Corporations Code. Part III summarizes the Supreme Court’s current approach to dormant-Commerce-Clause analysis, argues that the dormant Commerce Clause does not mandate the application of the
internal affairs doctrine, and demonstrates why section 2115 is permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause. It also argues that
the VantagePoint court incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent
to hold that the dormant Commerce Clause mandates the internal
affairs doctrine. Part IV concludes that narrowly drafted outreach
statutes are a permissible alternative to the internal affairs doctrine.

21

Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“We
conclude that to the extent that the cumulative voting requirement imposed by section 2115 upon pseudo-foreign corporations is shown to have any effect upon interstate commerce, the effect is incidental, and minimal in relation to the purpose
which that requirement is designed to achieve.”). California defines a pseudoforeign corporation to be “one with its technical domicile outside of [the] state but
one which exercises most of its corporate vitality within [the state].” W. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
22
871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
23
See id. at 1116.
24
Id.
25
See discussion infra Parts II.C, III.C.1–2.
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THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

Currently, the internal affairs doctrine enjoys canonical status as
26
a principle of corporate law. Despite isolated departures through27
out legal history, the “umbilical tie” of a corporation to its state of
incorporation is generally regarded as determinative of the law to be
28
applied to all intracorporate disputes. This widespread acceptance
is principally limited by the doctrine’s inapplicability to situations involving third parties, that is, situations outside a corporation’s inter29
nal affairs. Nonetheless, the doctrine is generally unquestioned by
modern corporate lawyers in most disputes involving internal af30
fairs.
A. A Brief Historical Overview
The doctrine’s rise began in the nineteenth century. It was first
31
articulated in 1868 by a New York appellate court, but initially failed
32
to gain traction in other jurisdictions. In 1885, the Court of Appeals
33
of Maryland, in North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, ener34
gized the doctrine by expressly adopting it, and by the end of the
35
century most states routinely applied it. Isolated judicial departures
26

See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (dictum) (“No
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations . . . .”).
27
See W. Air Lines v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)
(permitting regulation of internal affairs of a corporation having its technical domicile in another state but exercising most of its corporate vitality within California); see
also Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1959)
(“[D]ecisions . . . [applying the internal affairs doctrine are] inapplicable or unsound where the only contact point with the incorporating state is the naked fact of
incorporation, and where all [geographical] contact points . . . are found in another
jurisdiction.”); Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 141 P.2d 571, 573–74 (Okla. 1943)
(applying Oklahoma law to Delaware corporation as to inspection of books).
28
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216 (Del. 1987).
29
Id.; see also First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 621–22 (1983) (dictum); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Superior Court,
8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting McDermott, 531 A.2d at 216); id.
at 67–68 (quoting W. Air Lines, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 726).
30
Kozyris, supra note 19, at 19 (“[The internal affairs doctrine] is generally
treated as axiomatic.”).
31
See Howell v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 51 Barb. 378, 383–84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1868).
32
Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 227, 276 n.186 (1990).
33
20 A. 1039 (Md. 1885).
34
Id. at 1040–41.
35
See Sommer, supra note 32; see also Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S.
123, 130 (1933) (dictum) (citing multiple cases to support the widespread acceptance of the internal affairs doctrine).
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from the doctrine continued throughout the early twentieth cen36
tury, but they eventually disappeared as it became a routine part of
37
corporate law. Resulting from this widespread acceptance, there is
no significant common-law competitor to the internal affairs doctrine. Modern questions as to its applicability arise almost exclusively
38
in the context of a competing outreach statute.
Despite the internal affairs doctrine’s continued vitality, many of
the conditions that led to its creation have faded or disappeared.
The doctrine evolved during a relatively primitive stage of corporate
law, where courts closely associated corporations, even private ones,
39
with the governments of their originating states. This perception,
along with technological barriers, discouraged courts from meddling
in the internal affairs of foreign corporations. Referencing principles
of sovereignty, courts consistently noted the legal limits of their
power over foreign corporations, and the special relationship that
40
such corporations had with their jurisdiction of incorporation. The
internal affairs doctrine allowed these courts to avoid the murky
problem of asserting judicial authority over these pseudo-sovereign
entities.
This reluctance to meddle in the affairs of foreign corporations,
in addition to supportive legal and technological innovations, facilitated a corporate charter competition, whereby states (through low
taxes or efficient corporation codes) competed for the revenue that
41
corporations bring to local markets. With the general acceptance of
the internal affairs doctrine, investors could now be sure that wherever they went, courts would respect their corporate form. Supporting this legal development was the repeal, starting in New Jersey, of
statutes requiring domestic corporations to maintain a physical pres36

See Sommer, supra note 32 (citing Travis v. Knox Terpazone Co., 109 N.E. 250,
251–52 (N.Y. 1915)).
37
But see W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
38
See, e.g., Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
39
See Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to
Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 561 (2005).
40
See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine 35–
37 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-04,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686592. In 1874, Justice Bradley wrote:
[I]t is commonly said that the State has absolute control over the corporations of its own creation, and may impose upon them such conditions as it pleases; and like control over its own territory, highways, and
bridges . . . . [We must pursue our analysis in light of] the very plenary
powers which a State has always been conceded to have over its own
territory, its highways, its franchises, and its corporations . . . .
R.R. Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 472–73 (1875).
41
Tung, supra note 39, at 544.
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42

ence within the state. By divorcing the corporation’s physical reality
from its jurisdiction of incorporation, states could now attract businesses, regardless of their geographical location. The result of these
developments was that New Jersey, and then Delaware, became the
43
home state of the majority of large, U.S. corporations.
The charter competition’s proponents and detractors continually engage in what has become a classic debate. Supporters of the
44
competition have suggested that it maximizes value to shareholders.
Critics argue that the charter competition gives state legislatures an
incentive to “race to the bottom” by enacting corporation codes
45
skewed in favor of managerial interests. Some have even suggested
that a federal corporation code would be preferable to the current
46
47
system. Despite such criticisms, and increased federal regulation,
48
corporate law remains primarily a state affair. So for now, the in-

42

Id.
See Tung, supra note 40, at 3. Many corporations left New Jersey for Delaware
after Governor Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Party in the New Jersey legislature revised the corporation code. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2390 (1998).
44
See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919–20 (1982);
Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 504 (2001) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine any real-world
political process that would do a better job at enhancing share value than the competitive process in which Delaware is the prominent incorporation state.”).
45
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440–41 (1992) (arguing
that state charter competition creates rules biased toward managerial interests); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
663–66 (1974) (arguing that state charter competition creates a race to the bottom).
46
E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 45, at 1437–42. Professor Bebchuk writes:
This Article puts forward a new approach to the question of state
charter competition. My analysis indicates that this competition works
well in some areas of corporate law but poorly in others; that is, state
competition produces a race for the top with respect to some corporate
issues but a race for the bottom with respect to others. More importantly, my analysis identifies those issues with respect to which state
competition is likely to produce undesirable rules. This analysis provides workable criteria that I use to delineate the desirable limits on
state competition and advocate a significant expansion of federal corporate law.
Id at 1440.
47
E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
48
See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2005) (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is, at most, a
fairly narrow exception as it arguably alters the allocation of authority only in its audit committee provisions.”).
43
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ternal affairs doctrine remains the lynchpin of this controversial system.
B. The Modern Internal Affairs Doctrine
49

In McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, the Supreme Court of Delaware reaffirmed its commitment to the internal affairs doctrine by declining
50
to apply Delaware law to a Panama corporation’s internal affairs.
The relevant issue in McDermott was whether a ninety-two-percentowned subsidiary of a Panamanian parent corporation could vote its
51
ten-percent interest in the parent corporation’s common stock.
The court noted that no United States jurisdiction permitted this vot52
ing practice, but Panama did. The court applied Panama law to the
dispute and allowed the voting practice, citing the internal affairs
53
doctrine as being “well established” in Delaware. The court summarized the doctrine: “The internal affairs doctrine requires that the law
of the state of incorporation should determine issues relating to internal corporate affairs. Under Delaware conflict of laws principles
and the United States Constitution, there are appropriate circum54
stances which mandate application of this doctrine.”
McDermott articulates three federal constitutional bases that
mandate the internal affairs doctrine: the Full Faith and Credit
55
56
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
57
and the Commerce Clause. Of the three principles, the dormant

49

531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
Id. at 208–09.
51
See id.
52
Id. at 212.
53
Id. at 215.
54
Id. (citation omitted).
55
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935)
(applying the law of the state of incorporation pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 256–58 (1912) (allowing receiver to sue
stockholders in a state other than the state of incorporation, and finding that a state
must give full faith and credit to laws of the state of incorporation). But see Kozyris,
supra note 19, at 31 (noting a countertrend beginning with Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial. Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)).
56
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen,
Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005); see also Kozyris, supra note 19, at 39 (noting
that recent developments in the Supreme Court suggest that not applying the internal affairs doctrine may violate due process).
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113 (explaining
that the U.S. Constitution mandates the internal affairs doctrine partially because of
the Commerce Clause).
50
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Commerce Clause is the most important in this context.
Courts
59
rarely refer to the Due Process Clause, and they no longer rely on
60
the Full Faith and Credit Clause at all.
The dormant-Commerce-Clause basis for the internal affairs
doctrine is the most powerful, because it plays upon the Supreme
Court of the United States’ sensitivity to the potential burdens of in61
consistent regulation upon interstate commerce. Indeed, the burden
of inconsistent regulation occupied a significant portion of McDer62
mott’s analysis.
Taken as a whole, McDermott suggests that virtual
chaos is the sole alternative to the strict application of the internal affairs doctrine.
Despite McDermott’s analysis, the Supreme Court of the United
States has never taken the position that the U.S. Constitution mandates the internal affairs doctrine. Indeed, the doctrine dominates
the past and present of corporate law—courts rarely hesitate to apply
it—but it evolved in an economic world very different from our own.
And until the Supreme Court of the United States rules definitively
upon the subject, states are free to contemplate alternative regimes
(such as outreach statutes) to govern the internal affairs of foreign
corporations.
II. OUTREACH STATUTES: SECTION 2115 AND VANTAGEPOINT VENTURE
63
PARTNERS 1996 V. EXAMEN
An outreach statute applies the substantive law of the forum
64
state to a foreign corporation in certain limited circumstances.
58
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). See generally Kozyris, supra note 19, at 35–46.
59
But cf. McDermott, 531 A.2d at 216 (“[D]irectors and officers have a significant
right, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, to know what law will
be applied to their actions.”).
60
See Kozyris, supra note 19, at 31.
61
The Supreme Court has often invalidated statutes for subjecting interstate
commerce to inconsistent regulations. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583–84 (1986); Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642–43 (plurality
opinion); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981); S.
Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 774 (1945).
62
See McDermott, 531 A.2d at 216 (Del. 1987) (“‘[A]pplying local internal affairs
law to a foreign corporation . . . is apt to produce inequalities, intolerable confusion,
and uncertainty, and intrude into the domain of other states that have a superior
claim to regulate the same subject matter . . . .’” (quoting Kozyris, supra note 19, at
98)).
63
871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
64
Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law—A Comparison of the United States and
European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 25
(2002); see discussion supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the internal affairs doctrine, outreach statutes do not have a
long history, and only California and New York have implemented
65
explicit outreach provisions in their corporation codes. New York’s
outreach statutes subject foreign corporations to forum law regarding, among other things, the right to inspect shareholder lists, the filing of a record of voting trusts, the liability of officers and directors,
and the liability of corporations for failure to disclose certain infor66
67
mation. Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code contains an even broader range of substantive provisions that are poten68
tially applicable.
69
But section 2115 is narrow in scope. Section 2115 will apply to
a foreign corporation only if: 1) the average of the corporation’s
70
71
72
property factor, payroll factor, and sales factor, as defined by the

65
DeMott, supra note 9, at 164; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp.
2006); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1315–1320 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 2005).
66
DeMott, supra note 9, at 164–65 (citing N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1315–1320
(Consol. 1983 & Supp. 2005)).
67
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.
68
Once the code is found to apply, California law governs many issues involving
directors, including the annual election of directors, the removal of directors without
cause, the removal of directors by court proceedings, the filling of director vacancies
where less than a majority in office was elected by shareholders, the directors’ standard of care, the liability of directors for unlawful distributions, and the indemnification of directors, officers, and others. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b). Additionally, California law governs limitations on corporate distributions in cash or property, the
liability of shareholders who receive unlawful distributions, the requirement for an
annual shareholders’ meeting and the remedy if same is not timely held, the shareholder’s right to cumulate votes at any election of directors, and the supermajority
vote requirement. Id. Finally, the code imposes limitations on sales of assets, mergers, and conversions; dictates the requirements of conversions; and governs reorganizations, dissenter’s rights, content of records and reports, actions by an attorney
general, and the rights of inspection. Id.
69
Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2115(a), (c) (West Supp. 2006) (restricting section’s applicability to close corporations having predominant contacts with California), with N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1317 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 2005) (applying director
liability provisions to any foreign corporation doing business in New York).
70
The California Revenue and Taxation Code calculates the property factor in
the following manner:
The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average
value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or
rented and used in this state during the taxable year and the denominator of which is the average value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used during the taxable
year.
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 25129 (West 1990).
71
The California Revenue and Taxation Code calculates the payroll factor in the
following manner: “The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount paid in this state during the taxable year by the taxpayer for compensa-
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73

California Revenue and Taxation Code, is greater than fifty percent;
and 2) more than one-half of its voting securities are held by persons
listed in the latest meeting of shareholders as having California ad74
dresses. Publicly traded corporations are completely excluded from
75
its reach. Once triggered, section 2115 provides that most aspects
of California corporate law apply to the internal affairs of foreign cor76
porations.
77
In VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court considered and rejected applying section 2115.
VantagePoint was a dispute over a merger involving Examen, Inc.
(“Examen”), a Delaware corporation of which VantagePoint Venture
Partners 1996, Inc. (“VantagePoint”) owned a majority of Series A
78
Preferred Stock but no common stock. VantagePoint opposed the
merger, but a majority of Examen’s shareholders approved it in a
79
cumulative vote pursuant to Delaware law. Had California law applied, VantagePoint would have been able to vote its shares as a sepa80
rate class, effectively giving it a veto over the merger. VantagePoint
asserted that section 2115 of the California Corporations Code
81
should have displaced Delaware law and required class voting.
Rejecting the application of section 2115, the court reaffirmed
82
McDermott’s articulation of the internal affairs doctrine. However,
the true significance of the case was that it held that the Federal Con83
stitution mandates the application of the internal affairs doctrine; in
this case, against the backdrop of a competing outreach statute. So
for the first time, albeit indirectly, a case has placed the basic constitutionality of outreach statutes at issue, and a court has categorically

tion, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the taxable year.” Id. § 25132.
72
The California Revenue and Taxation Code calculates the sales factor in the
following manner: “The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total
sales of the taxpayer in this state during the taxable year, and the denominator of
which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the taxable year.” Id. §
25134.
73
Id.
74
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a)(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 2006).
75
Id. § 2115(c).
76
See id. § 2115(a)(2).
77
871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
78
Id. at 1111.
79
See id. at 1110–11.
80
Id. at 1111.
81
See id. at 1109–12.
82
See id. at 1114, 1116; see supra text accompanying note 54.
83
VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1116.
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rejected their applicability. The influence of this case has been felt
even in California, where recently a state appellate court extensively
quoted VantagePoint for its endorsement of the internal affairs doc84
trine, its identification of the doctrine’s “constitutional underpin85
86
nings,” and its critical analysis of section 2115.
III.

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
DOCTRINE, AND SECTION 2115

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the positive power to
87
regulate interstate commerce. It also operates negatively, as a re88
straint on state regulation. This restraint is a principle known as the
89
dormant Commerce Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court decides
when to invoke this restraint mostly by using a test articulated in Pike
90
v. Bruce Church, Inc.. Over time, the Court has refined the doctrine
and identified certain types of regulations that are especially likely to
fail dormant-Commerce-Clause scrutiny.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Absent federal legislation states may freely regulate commerce,
so long as they act within the bounds of the dormant Commerce
91
Clause. The Supreme Court of the United States has articulated sev92
eral distinct tests for determining these bounds. The older tests define bright-line categories of permissible and impermissible regula84

Grosset v. Wenaas, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), cert. granted sub
nom., depublished by Grosset v. Wenaas (Huang), 127 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2006) (quoting
VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113).
85
Id. at 66, 68–69 (quoting VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113–16).
86
Id. at 68 (quoting VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113–16).
87
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 (1824).
88
See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996); Associated Indus.
of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1994); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299, 317 (1851); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 6.
89
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 401 (2d
ed. 2002).
90
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
91
See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (citing Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1977)).
92
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (“A state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens foreign commerce is a prohibited regulation and
invalid . . . .”); Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319 (prohibiting state regulation of national subject matter requiring uniform regulation but allowing state regulation of
local subject matter requiring diverse regulation); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199–
200, 203 (permitting laws adopted under the police power versus laws regulating
commerce among the states).
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tions. Generally, the Court has abandoned these rigid rules. The
modern approach combines a threshold criterion with a balancing
95
Furthermore, some regulations so affect the balancing test,
test.
96
they function like threshold criteria. Regardless of the approach,
the Court will look to the underlying policies of the dormant Com97
merce Clause to guide its application.
98
These policies are rooted in history, economics, and politics.
Justice Brennan concisely captured the historical element when he
wrote for the Court that the Framers of the Constitution drafted the
Commerce Clause “to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
99
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” As to the
economic element, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the dormant
Commerce Clause to be based upon an “implicit free market pol100
icy.” Finally, Justice White encapsulated the political consequences
of unrestrained state regulation of interstate commerce: “Unrepresented interests will often bear the brunt of regulations imposed by
one State [that have] a significant effect on persons or operations in
101
Representation, of course, is a central feature of
other States.”
American democracy. Each of these policies influences an informed
dormant-Commerce-Clause analysis.

93
See DiSanto, 273 U.S. at 37; Cooley, 53 U.S. (12. How.) at 319; Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 199–200, 203.
94
But see, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986) (applying direct/indirect test); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
640 (1982) (plurality opinion) (applying direct/indirect test).
95
See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
96
See infra text accompanying notes 118–123.
97
See infra text accompanying notes 98–101.
98
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 89, at 403–04.
99
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (dictum).
100
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 425 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101
S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984) (dictum); see
also S.C. State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938) (dictum):
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of
those without, or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within, have been thought to impinge
upon the . . . [Commerce Clause] even though Congress has not acted.
Id.
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The Modern Approach

The modern approach begins by determining whether a state
regulatory measure facially or effectively discriminates against out-of102
state commerce in favor of domestic trade.
Discriminatory regulations are policies that favor in-state over out-of-state economic inter103
ests.
Where such favoritism exists, the regulation is almost always
104
The Supreme Court of the United States has invalidated
invalid.
regulations that prohibited the sale of electricity over state lines with105
out permission from an in-state commission, required a waste dis106
posal fee for out-of-state waste but not in-state waste, and prevented
107
the transport of minnows for sale in other states.
A regulation that does not discriminate must still undergo a balancing test that weighs the local benefits of a challenged regulation
108
against the burden it imposes upon interstate commerce.
If the
regulation’s burden is “clearly excessive” in relation to the local bene109
fits,
the law will be invalidated under the dormant Commerce
110
111
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., Justice Stewart summarized
Clause.
this test: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
112
benefits.”
102
See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201–02 (1994) (“‘The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.’” (quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S.
454, 455-56 (1940))). But see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978)
(upholding a law preventing out-of-state petroleum refiners from operating gas stations within the state).
103
See Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994) (“The [dormant
Commerce] Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, ‘regulatory measures
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’” (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988))).
104
Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331; Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36–37
(1980).
105
New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 337–39 (1982).
106
Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339–49 (1992).
107
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
108
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
109
Id.
110
See id.
111
Id.
112
Id. The Court refined this articulation in later cases:
When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests
over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute
without further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect ef-
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Pike was a case arising out of Arizona’s attempt to enforce an order requiring a local cantaloupe grower to pack his harvest in a spe113
cific type of container.
Normally, the grower packed the canta114
loupes in a nearby California facility.
The practical effect of the
order was to require the grower to build packing facilities within the
115
state and lose the current year’s crop to spoilage. The Court found
that the burden of having to build local packing facilities outweighed
Arizona’s interest in having cantaloupes packed in special containers
116
The Court explained that it was
for the purpose of advertisement.
particularly suspicious of state statutes requiring businesses to perform operations within the home state when they could be more effi117
ciently performed elsewhere.
2.

Suspicious Regulations

Although balancing is always the test for validity under the dormant Commerce Clause, some types of regulations are so suspicious
that the Supreme Court will almost always invalidate them. For instance, when a state regulates activities taking place wholly outside its
118
For instance,
borders, the Court will usually invalidate the action.
119
in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, the
Court struck down a law that required liquor wholesalers to sell in
120
New York at the lowest price that they charged in any other state.
The Court noted that the statute had the “‘practical effect’ of . . . con121
trol[ling] liquor prices in other States.”
The Pike test is relevant to
analyzing these types of statutes because, to the extent they burden
122
out-of-state transactions, there are no local interests to balance.

fects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)
(citations omitted).
113
Pike, 397 U.S. at 138.
114
Id. at 139.
115
Id. at 140.
116
Id. at 145.
117
Id.
118
See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982).
119
476 U.S. 573 (1986).
120
Id. at 582–83.
121
Id. at 583; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989) (invalidating a
Connecticut law requiring liquor wholesalers to “affirm” that their prices were no
higher than prices in other states).
122
See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644 (dictum).
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Statutes that subject corporations to inconsistent regulations will
123
also often fail constitutional scrutiny. The Court looks for inconsistency by assessing the practical effect of a regulation against the
background of other states’ legitimate regulatory regimes, and by
imagining its likely effects if all states were to adopt the same or a
124
These regulations are invalidated based on the
similar regulation.
Court’s perceiving “a compelling need for national uniformity in
125
126
regulation.”
However, this has happened in only a few cases.
In
127
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, the Court declared unconstitutional a
state law that required trucks to use a particular mudguard when
forty-five other states allowed a different type and one state had even
128
In Southern
outlawed the mudguard that the regulation mandated.
129
Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, the Court struck down a law
limiting train lengths when neighboring states permitted longer
130
The Court summarized this approach in CTS Corp. v. Dytrains.
131
132
namics Corp. of America, which is discussed below.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Internal Corporate Affairs
It is likely that the Supreme Court of the United States will eventually hear a case concerning the constitutionality of section 2115 or
133
another similar outreach statute. Already the Court has heard cases
involving some issues that are sure to arise in this potential litigation.
134
These cases are Edgar v. MITE Corp., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
135
136
America, and Atherton v. FDIC, which are important because they
offer clues about how the Court will treat an outreach statute under
the Pike balancing test.

123

See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (“This Court’s
recent Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated statutes that may adversely affect
interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations.”); see also Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005).
124
Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37.
125
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 n.12 (1997) (dictum).
126
Id.
127
359 U.S. 520 (1959).
128
Id. at 523, 529.
129
325 U.S. 761 (1945).
130
Id. at 763, 781.
131
481 U.S 69, 88–89 (1987).
132
See infra Part III.B.2.
133
See Kozyris, supra note 19, at 60.
134
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
135
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
136
519 U.S. 213 (1997).
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In VantagePoint, the Delaware Supreme Court took these clues to
137
mean that Edgar and CTS support the internal affairs doctrine.
Many of VantagePoint’s citations, however, misconstrue the context of
the Supreme Court of the United States’ discussions. Although VantagePoint relies on both Edgar and CTS to support the contention that
the Constitution mandates the internal affairs doctrine, these cases
contain discussions that consider criteria aside from technical incorporation, in order to help determine the magnitude of a state’s inter138
139
Atherton contains a similar discussion.
This
est in a corporation.
authority undermines VantagePoint’s assertion that Edgar and CTS
support the constitutional bases of the internal affairs doctrine. It
also suggests that outreach statutes containing enough jurisdictional
hooks may survive dormant-Commerce-Clause scrutiny.
1.

Edgar v. MITE Corp.

140

Edgar involved a Delaware corporation that initiated a tender of141
fer for shares of an Illinois corporation. It was not a pure internalaffairs case because tender offers implicate transactions with third
parties and create issues extending beyond a corporation’s internal
142
relations. Illinois had a hostile takeover statute that required a tender offeror to comply with several regulations that significantly de143
The law applied if the targeted
layed the proposed transaction.
corporation met two of three conditions: it had its principal office in
Illinois, was incorporated in Illinois, or had “at least 10% of its stated
144
The Supreme
capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois.”
Court struck down the statute because it violated, among other
145
things, the dormant Commerce Clause.
Justice White applied two different dormant-Commerce-Clause
standards to the Illinois statute and found that it was unconstitutional

137

See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 passim
(Del. 2005).
138
See discussion infra Parts III.B.1–2.
139
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
140
457 U.S. 624.
141
Id. at 627.
142
See id. at 645 (dictum) (“Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the
target company.”).
143
See id. at 626–27.
144
Id. at 642.
145
See id. at 640. The court also found that the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000 & Supp. I 2002), superseded Illinois law under the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 639.
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146

under both.
The first, which did not carry a majority of the
147
148
Under this
Court, was the old bright-line direct/indirect test.
test, the statute failed because it directly regulated interstate com149
150
merce. The second standard, which five Justices endorsed, found
151
Justice
the statute’s burdens to be too great under the Pike test.
White identified specific burdens and benefits to balance when apply152
ing the standard.
The statute’s burdens on interstate commerce included depriving shareholders the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium,
hindering the shares’ reallocation to a higher valued use and reducing the incentive for management to keep stock prices high, all of
153
which occurred on a nationwide scale.
The regulation’s national
154
The
scope amplified its hindrance of efficiency and competition.
only countervailing local interest that the Court unequivocally recognized was Illinois’ interest in protecting local investors, but so far as
the statute burdened out-of-state transactions, the Court found there
155
was no local state interest to be weighed. Diminishing the gravity of
this interest, Justice White opined that the regulation’s actual protec156
tion of local investors was “speculative.”
The defendant argued that the internal affairs doctrine was also
a local benefit that weighed against the burdens imposed on inter157
state commerce.
The argument failed because “[t]he Act . . . applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have
their principal place of business in other States. Illinois has no inter158
The
est in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.”
146

Id. at 643 (plurality opinion) (“Because the Illinois Act . . . regulate[s] directly .
. . it must be held invalid . . . . The Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test
of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. . . . .”).
147
Id. at 625 (plurality opinion).
148
Id. at 641–43 (plurality opinion); see supra note 94.
149
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion).
150
Id. at 625.
151
Id. at 643–46.
152
Id. (dictum).
153
See id. at 643–44 (dictum) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161, 1173–74 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for
Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5, 27–28, 45
(1978)).
154
See id. (dictum).
155
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
156
Id. at 645 (dictum).
157
Id. at 645 (“Appellant also contends that Illinois has an interest in regulating
the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws.”).
158
Id. at 645–46.
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VantagePoint court relied on the second sentence of this dictum in
order to support its application of the internal affairs doctrine under
159
the dormant Commerce Clause.
In isolation, the “no interest” language suggests that outreach
statutes will inevitably fail the Pike balancing test because they designedly regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations. However,
the context suggests otherwise. The Edgar court analysis, regarding
160
the “principal place of business,” which the VantagePoint court did
not reprint, shows that the Supreme Court of the United States might
consider traits beyond paper incorporation when determining a corporation’s domicile—at least for the limited purpose of analyzing internal-affairs regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. In
Edgar, the “principal place of business,” in addition to the state of in161
corporation, was relevant to this determination.
Delaware law does not use the “principal place of business” as a
factor in determining a corporation’s domestic or foreign identity
under the internal affairs doctrine; the sole issue is technical incor162
And the Supreme Court might generally agree with this
poration.
determination of identity under state law, but it does not necessarily
follow that an identical standard applies under the dormant Commerce Clause. VantagePoint’s reliance on Edgar is overstated insofar as
it assumes that regulating a foreign corporation is always equivalent
to regulating foreign interests. An outreach statute such as section
163
2115 contains extensive criteria to identify where a corporation
164
primarily exists. By identifying this primary location, the statute, in
effect, identifies whether local interests predominate. This statutory
determination, when valid, avoids the constitutional problems that
the Supreme Court discerns when a state does not have local interests
to balance against the burden of regulating corporations formed by
other states.

159

See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112–
13 (Del. 2005).
160
See supra text accompanying note 158.
161
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645–46.
162
VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1112 (“[O]nly one state should have the authority to
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—the state of incorporation.”).
163
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006).
164
Id. § 2115(a).
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165
166

CTS, like Edgar, involved a state anti-takeover statute, the Wil167
168
liams Act,
and the dormant Commerce Clause.
This time,
though, the Court upheld the takeover statute because it neither discriminated against interstate commerce nor subjected it to inconsis169
Unlike the statute at issue in Edgar, this one regutent regulation.
lated tender offers involving only domestically chartered
170
corporations.
Justice Powell found that the statute did not discriminate against
171
interstate commerce either facially or in practical effect. Facially, it
had a uniform effect on tender offers, without regard to whether the
172
The Justice found
initiator was an Indiana resident or domiciliary.
that its practical effect did not evidence discrimination either, even
though more tender offers came from outside the state than from
173
“‘The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on
within it.
some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of dis174
crimination against interstate commerce.’”
The Indiana statute requires that those seeking control shares
must gain approval from a majority of the target corporation’s shareholders before being able to exercise the voting rights of the ac175
quired shares.
This mechanism has the practical effect of conditioning “acquisition of control of a corporation on approval of a

165

481 U.S. 69 (1987).
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 2005).
167
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000 & Supp. I 2002).
168
CTS, 481 U.S. at 72.
169
Id. at 88–89.
170
The Indiana Act only applies to “issuing public corporation[s],” which are defined as corporations having:
(1) One hundred (100) or more shareholders;
(2) Its principal place of business, its principal office, or substantial assets within Indiana; and
(3) Either:
(A) More than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resident in
Indiana;
(B) More than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by Indiana
residents; or
(C) Ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indiana.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (West 2005).
171
CTS, 481 U.S. at 87–88.
172
Id. at 87.
173
Id. at 88.
174
Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)).
175
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (West 2005).
166
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majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders.”
Justice
Powell defended the validity of the statute by emphasizing Indiana’s
legitimate interest in regulating the corporations it charters:
So long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of
only one State. No principle of corporation law and practice is
more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting
177
rights of shareholders.

Although the Justice emphasized the state of incorporation as
178
having an interest in “the corporations it has created,” he added
that “unlike the Illinois statute invalidated in Edgar, the Indiana statute applies only to corporations that have a substantial number of
shareholders in Indiana. Thus, every application of the Indiana Act
will affect a substantial number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana
179
This is in line with Edindisputably has an interest in protecting.”
gar’s theme of considering characteristics beyond technical incorporation in order to determine a state’s interest in regulating a corporation’s internal affairs.
CTS’s positive treatment of a state’s interest in governing the internal affairs of its corporations should not be overemphasized, as it
180
was in VantagePoint.
Undoubtedly, a state’s right to govern the internal affairs of its corporations is one interest out of many to be
weighed in the Pike balancing test, but as Professor Nat Stern observed: “[I]t is the protection of individuals and entities in whom the
state has a direct interest, not an abstract apotheosis of the [internal
affairs doctrine], that lies at the heart of CTS’s approval of the Indi181
ana statute.” Professor Stern concluded that when individual interests are implicated, “it would be ironic if technical incorporation in a

176

CTS, 481 U.S. at 74.
Id. at 89.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 93 (citation omitted).
180
The VantagePoint court repeatedly relied on CTS to support the internal affairs
doctrine. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112
(Del. 2005); id. at 1113 (“It is now well established that only the law of the state of
incorporation governs and determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation.” (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at 89–93)); id. at 1115 (emphasizing importance of
stability in intracorporate relationships (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at 95)); id. at 1116
(quoting CTS, 481 U.S. at 89); id. at 1118 (indicating the broad acceptance of the
internal affairs doctrine (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at 89–90)).
181
Nat Stern, Circumventing Lax Fiduciary Standards: The Possibility of Shareholder
Multistate Class Actions for Directors’ Breach of the Duty of Due Care, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1, 52–
53 (1993).
177
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state—often little more than a formality—were to carry more weight
182
than residency.”
3.

Atherton v. FDIC

183

The Atherton Court considered a case where the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) acted as receiver for a federally
chartered bank, in order to defend allegations that its directors
184
breached a fiduciary duty.
The legal controversy was whether to
apply federal common law, instead of state law, in determining the
185
The FDIC argued for applying federal
directors’ standard of care.
law, because the otherwise applicable state law would have held the
directors to a higher standard of care and increased the chances of
186
The Court held that,
the Court finding a breach of fiduciary duty.
despite the bank’s federal charter, state law controls a director’s standard of care, so long as the state standard is stricter than the federal
187
standard.
The case is less relevant to this Comment than Edgar or CTS, and
VantagePoint does not mention the case; however, the Court extensively analogized its decision to an analysis under the internal affairs
188
This analogy shows how the Court might determine a
doctrine.
corporation’s domicile when it is necessary to consider factors beyond technical incorporation. Justice Breyer justified the Court’s decision to apply state law: “The internal affairs doctrine shows no
[need to create federal common law when a conflict with state law
occurs], for it seeks only to avoid conflict by requiring that there be a
single point of legal reference. Nothing in that doctrine suggests that
189
the single source of law must be federal.” The Justice continued:
In the absence of a governing federal common law, courts applying the internal affairs doctrine could find (we do not say that
they will find) that the State closest analogically to the State of incorporation of an ordinary business is the State in which the federally chartered bank has its main office or maintains its principal
190
place of business.

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 53.
519 U.S. 213 (1997).
Id. at 215–16.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 224.
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 224.
Id.
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This analogy effectively describes the elements, aside from technical
incorporation, of a domestic corporation.
Having a main office and maintaining a local principal place of
business were factors that the Justice considered to be “stand-ins” for
191
actual incorporation.
In this case, because the bank was federally
chartered, and therefore lacked a state of incorporation, the Court
used the factors to determine which state had the greatest interest in
regulating the bank’s internal affairs. In Edgar and CTS, the Court
considered the same elements when it balanced interests under Pike,
although because these cases involved state corporations, and not a
federally chartered bank, the place of incorporation was an addi192
tional factor.
What remains for the Court to decide is whether a
state possessing enough of these “stand-ins” has a greater interest in
regulating internal affairs than a state possessing technical incorporation and fewer “stand-ins.”
To the extent that VantagePoint relied on the aforementioned
cases to show that the technical state of incorporation always has the
greatest interest in regulating a corporation, the reliance was misplaced. In all three cases the Court looked to factors beyond the
mere place of incorporation, to determine where the interests lay. In
VantagePoint, the Delaware Supreme Court might have been able to
find that the factors weighed in favor of Delaware’s interests, but, if
so, it should have applied the Pike balancing test. Instead, the court
leapt to the conclusion that the internal affairs doctrine was constitutionally mandated.
This leap undermines the holding, because without a separate
dormant-Commerce-Clause analysis, the VantagePoint court’s approach to the constitutional permissibility of outreach statutes collapses into a determination of whether or not a state regulation violates the internal affairs doctrine. But even if a regulation violates the
internal affairs doctrine, it does not necessarily follow that it fails
dormant-Commerce-Clause scrutiny. The constitutional principle
stands on its own, without the aid of state judicial doctrines. It is Pike,
and not VantagePoint, that courts must use to assess the constitutionality of outreach statutes.
C. Section 2115 and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Section 2115 is the logical extension of Edgar’s and CTS’s theme,
and is consistent with the discussion in Atherton. The outreach statute
191
192

See id.
See supra Part III.B.1–2.
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possesses specific jurisdictional limiters that address the Supreme
193
As held by a California
Court’s primary constitutional concerns.
194
appellate court in Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., section
2115 does not discriminate, nor does it place an inordinate burden
195
upon interstate commerce. Wilson, however, is just a starting point,
as it was decided before CTS, and only shortly after Edgar. Wilson provides a strong framework for assessing outreach statutes under the
dormant Commerce Clause. And when one compares section 2115
to the statute upheld in CTS, the Wilson framework appears even
stronger.
Wilson came up on an appeal by defendant Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc. (“Louisiana-Pacific”) to overturn the lower court’s declaratory judgment that the corporation was subject to section 2115
196
and that section 2115 did not violate the U.S. Constitution. Louisiana-Pacific was a Utah corporation that had maintained itself primar197
ily in California for at least ten years prior to the litigation.
In affirming the lower court’s judgment, the court applied the Pike
balancing test to section 2115 and determined that the statute was
198
The court
constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
also found that the statute was constitutional under the Full Faith and
199
Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend200
201
ment, the Contract Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of
202
the Fourteenth Amendment.
203
First, the court applied Pike’s discrimination threshold test.
The court observed that section 2115 regulates even-handedly because it applies the same laws to foreign corporations as it does to its
own corporations, and places no additional burdens on “out-of-state
204
This is actually truer today than it was when Wilson was
interests.”
193

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006).
187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
195
Id. at 861 (“We conclude that to the extent that the cumulative voting requirement imposed by section 2115 upon pseudo-foreign corporations is shown to
have any effect upon interstate commerce, the effect is incidental, and minimal in
relation to the purpose which that requirement is designed to achieve.”).
196
Id. at 854–55.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 858–61.
199
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
200
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
201
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
202
Id. amend. XIV, § 1; Wilson v. L.A.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 862–63
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
203
Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
204
Id.
194
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decided. Previously, section 2108 of the California Corporations
Code required foreign corporations to file an annual statement as to
whether they met the tests under section 2115(a), or else forfeit the
205
Before the section was
right to transact business within the state.
repealed, it was arguably a burden that only foreign corporations had
to bear. The repeal of section 2108 enhanced the evenhandedness of
section 2115 by removing a minor but significant discriminatory element.
206
The court next turned to balancing under Pike. The principle
burden of section 2115 on interstate commerce is its potential to subject corporations to inconsistent regulations from year to year based
207
on rapidly changing financial conditions.
The Wilson court addressed this argument by first pointing out that the statute cannot
conflict with another state’s regulations, so long as all states require
majority contacts, before regulating foreign corporations:
The potential for conflict and resulting uncertainty from California’s statute is substantially minimized by the nature of the criteria specified in section 2115. A corporation can do a majority of
its business in only one state at a time; and it can have a majority
of its shareholders resident in only one state at a time. If a corporation meets those requirements in this state, no other state is in a
position to regulate the method of voting by shareholders on the
basis of the same or similar criteria. It might also be said that no
other state could claim as great an interest in doing so. In any
event, it does not appear that any other state has attempted to do
so. If California’s statute were replicated in all states, no conflict
would result. We conclude that the potential for conflict is, on
208
this record, speculative and without substance.

As the court further explained, section 2115 is completely differ209
ent than the Illinois statute invalidated in Edgar, where many states
210
The
could have potentially applied the same kind of regulation.
court also found that the burden under the “worst-case scenario” was
that a corporation might be subject to California substantive law,
211
which was not an unreasonable burden.

205
206
207
208
209
210
211

CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108(d) (West 1990) (repealed 1997).
Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 858–61.
See DeMott, supra note 9, at 166.
Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (footnotes omitted).
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.6.
See id.
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Section 2115 is more like the Indiana statute upheld in CTS.
The Supreme Court of the United States found the Indiana statute to
be valid, in part because it preserved a regime under which corpora213
tions are subject to a single law.
The statute’s applicability to only
Indiana corporations avoided the danger of the Court’s perceiving it
as conflicting with other states’ regimes, which would generally be an
214
Section 2115 accomplishes the same goal,
impermissible burden.
albeit with the significance of its required contacts as opposed to the
215
requirement of technical incorporation. The potential for all states
to enact an identical regulation without conflict is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s recognizing a “compelling need for [regulatory]
216
uniformity.”
Setting aside the issue of technical incorporation, section 2115
implicates far greater state interests than the Indiana statute does.
Proportionally, section 2115 will always apply to a far greater number
217
of shareholders than will the Indiana statute. Section 2115 also requires that the majority of shareholders, property, and payroll are in
218
California.
Finally, section 2115 never applies to publicly traded
219
corporations.
By contrast, the Indiana statute requires a corporation to have at
minimum one hundred shareholders and either “[i]ts principal place
220
of business, its principal office, or substantial assets within Indiana.”
Furthermore, it requires either more than ten percent of shareholders to be Indiana residents, more than ten percent of the shares to be
owned by Indiana residents, or ten thousand shareholders to reside
221
in Indiana.
So, in a corporation of one thousand shareholders,
Indiana law would apply if only one shareholder held over ten percent of the shares and the corporation had “substantial assets” in the
state. The required percentage might be even lower than ten percent, because institutional holdings are excluded from the calcula-

212

See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (dictum); see supra
text accompanying note 177.
214
See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
215
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 2006).
216
Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 n.12 (1997) (dictum).
217
Compare § 2115(a), with IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 2005). The
pertinent text of the Indiana statute is reprinted in this Comment’s discussion of
CTS. See supra note 170.
218
§ 2115(a).
219
See id. § 2115(e).
220
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-4(a)(1)-(2) (West 2005).
221
Id. §§ 23-1-42-4(a)(3)(A)-(C).
213

HALLERFINAL

2007]

1/12/2007 11:23:49 AM

COMMENT

623

222

tion. Under section 2115, the same corporation (although unlikely
to exist as a closely held corporation) would require 501 shareholders
to be state residents and over fifty percent of property and business to
be in the state.
Although the CTS court recognized that the “substantial number
of Indiana residents” affected by the statute weighed favorably in the
223
Pike balancing test, the statute would certainly have been invali224
The
dated if it applied to corporations chartered in other states.
fact of incorporation was necessary to overcome the statute’s relatively meager contacts requirement. But section 2115 overcomes this
problem differently, through its predominant contacts requirement
225
and its exclusion of public corporations.
By requiring such strict
contacts, it lessens the need for the legal fiction of incorporation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

So long as the United States adheres to its current incorporation
scheme, narrowly tailored outreach statutes should be a permissible
part of determining the substantive law governing a corporation’s internal affairs. Without such statutes, states have no ability to protect
their domestic corporate actors, and they cannot promote internal
practices that facilitate sound corporate decision-making. Outreach
statutes similar to section 2115 can avoid dormant-Commerce-Clause
dangers by making sure to require predominant contacts before they
226
apply. Furthermore, restricting application to closely held corporations minimizes the effect on the free-flow of capital in the national
markets.
The internal affairs doctrine has long reigned supreme, and
there is no reason to think it will not continue to do so. Its main
competitors, including section 2115, are comparatively narrow exceptions to the doctrine’s general rule. A more credible threat to its su227
premacy is the potential expansion of federal corporate law.
Since
this threat has not yet manifested, some states have enacted outreach
statutes, which are essentially a means of asserting their right to govern subject matter that affects them more than it affects any other
state. This may not be the most efficient way to do business on a na-

222
223
224
225
226
227

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 cmt. c (LexisNexis 2006).
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987).
See id. at 91 (by implication).
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a), (e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2006).
See text accompanying notes 212–219.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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tional or international scale, but it is a reasonable compromise between local state interests and federal constitutional restraints.

